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Abstract 
The increasing policy interests and the vivid academic debate on non-tariff measures (NTMs) has 
stimulated a growing literature on how NTMs affect agri-food trade. The empirical literature 
provides contrasting and heterogeneous evidence, with some studies supporting the ‘standards as 
catalysts’ view, and others favouring the ‘standards as barriers’ explanation. To the extent that 
NTMs can influence trade, understanding the prevailing effect, and the motivations behind one 
effect or the other, is a pressing issue. 
We review a large body of empirical evidence on the effect of NTMs on agri-food trade and conduct 
a meta-analysis to disentangle potential determinants of heterogeneity in estimates. Our findings 
show the role played by the publication process and by study-specific assumptions. Some 
characteristics of the studies are correlated with positive significant estimates, others covary with 
negative significant estimates. Overall, we found that the effects of NTMs vary across types of 
NTMs, proxy for NTMs, and levels of details of studies. Not negligible is the influence of 
methodological issues and publication process. 
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The effects of non-tariff measures on agri-food trade:  
a review and meta-analysis of empirical evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which have substantially reduced 
tariffs and fostered global trade, the level of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has remained high and, 
indeed, has increased over time (Harvey, 1994). The NTMs are policy measures, alternative to 
tariffs, capable of modifying trade flows (Arita et al., 2017). The growing use of NTMs has led to a 
less transparent trade policy environment (Fernandes et al., 2017), which calls for a deeper 
understanding on if and how NTMs influence trade. 
The importance of understanding the trade effects of NTMs in agri-food sector is attested by the 
large and increasing number of papers hosted in top journals (e.g. Hooker and Caswell, 1999; 
Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Dawson 2006; Sheldon, 2006; Olper and Raimondi, 2008; Cioffi et al., 
2011; Beckman and Arita, 2016). In particular, the number of studies on trade effects of NTMs has 
significantly increased after 2000 (14 studies available up to 2000, while 140 studies published up 
to 2017), an upward trend that is parallel to the upward trend of the number of implemented NTMs 
(from 1.09 million of NTMs notified in 2000, to 4.35 million in 2017). However, the empirical 
evidence on the issue are heterogeneous and controversial: the magnitude and the direction (positive 
versus negative) of trade effects of NTMs, estimated in literature, are not clear cut. Some issues 
deserve attention and, in particular, we pose the following questions: what is the prevailing effect of 
NTMs on global agri-food trade? Do NTMs enhance or impede trade? Which factors influence the 
heterogeneity in estimates? 
These issues have been partly investigated by Cipollina and Salvatici (2008), Li and Beghin (2012), 
Beghin et al. (2015), and Salvatici et al. (2017). These reviews examine specific categories of 
NTMs or particular geographic areas: Cipollina and Salvatici (2008) pay attention to trade policies 
implemented at the border; Salvatici et al. (2017) deepen on the trade measures of the European 
Union. In addition, the existing reviews are qualitative analyses, exception made for Li and Beghin 
(2012) who propose a meta-analysis to explain the causes of variation in estimated effects of 
technical measures on trade of agri-food and manufacturing industries. By analysing a set of 27 
papers that are theoretically based on gravity model, Li and Beghin (2012) show that some 
determinants (e.g. specific agri-food sectors, exclusion of multilateral resistance terms) are 
associated with trade-impeding effects of technical measures. Some issues, however, are still 
underinvestigated. For instance, Li and Beghin (2012) do not deepen on the effects of the review 
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process (a major driver in meta-analyses) and on the influence of types and proxy of NTMs, as well 
as on the aggregation level at which the study is conducted1. 
We review empirical evidence on the effects of NTMs on global trade of agri-food products. We 
conduct a meta-analysis to conclude on potential determinants of heterogeneity in estimates. In 
order to complement previous studies, we analyse a larger, and more recent set of empirical 
researches on the trade effects of NTMs, by following methodological arguments of meta-analysis 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 1989; Stanley, 2005; Stanley et al., 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; 
Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2013; Stanley et al., 2013). We explain how magnitude, direction, 
statistical significance, and accuracy of estimates depends on types of NTMs, proxies used for 
NTMs, level of detail at which the study is conducted, methodological issues, and publication 
process. Our analysis complements the existing debate on how, and in which direction, NTMs tend 
to influence trade. 
 
2. The trade effect of non-tariff measures 
2.1 A theoretical perspective 
Tariffs are protectionist by definition: they undermine the social welfare by crowding out trade 
(Swinnen, 2016). Non-tariff instruments may be protectionist or competitive for trade: they imply 
welfare redistributions by addressing market imperfections such as asymmetric information and 
externalities (Xiong and Beghin, 2014). From a social perspective, while the optimal level of tariffs 
is zero, determining the optimal level of non-tariff instruments is challenging (Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele, 2011; Swinnen, 2017) due to the complex relationship linking trade and social 
effects of non-tariff instruments (Sheldon 2012). 
The understanding of non-tariff instruments has changed overtime: as the term ‘non-tariff barriers’ 
(NTBs), which emphasises their protectionist scopes (e.g. quotas, export restraints), has been 
replaced by ‘non-tariff measures’ (NTMs), in order to emphasise their potential role of hampering 
or facilitating trade (Grant and Arita, 2017). 
According to the definition proposed by UNCTAD (2012), NTMs are policy measures, other than 
ordinary customs tariffs, that may have economic effects on international trade of goods, changing 
traded quantities and/or prices. NTMs may also have a corrective role, by reducing asymmetric 
information (Technical Barriers to Trade, TBTs), mitigating risks in consumption, improving the 
sustainability of eco-systems (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPSs), and influencing the 
competition and the decision to import or export (non-technical NTMs). 
                                                          
1 Appendix A.1 provides a detailed comparison with Li and Beghin (2012). 
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In a small open economy the policymaker sets NTMs on a product category, produced in domestic 
market and imported from country’s trading partners, in order to maximise the domestic welfare: in 
domestic market, the optimal level of NTMs depends on the trade-off between the marginal utility 
gain for consumers and the marginal cost for producers. The effects on domestic welfare are 
influenced by trade strategies of trading partners. Exception made for the case in which the effects 
on domestic production exactly offset the effects on domestic consumption (Swinnen, 2016), NTMs 
are capable of influencing trade. 
From consumers’ perspective, NTMs are socially desirable and provide higher social well-being: by 
reducing asymmetric information and/or externalities, NTMs enhance consumers’ trust, reduce 
transaction costs and increase consumers’ demand (Xiong and Beghin, 2014). The growing demand 
and the higher costs of implementing NTMs increase the equilibrium price and, as a consequence, 
the consumption expenditures. The net effect of NTMs on consumers’ surplus depends on the 
magnitude of (positive) utility gain compared to the size of (negative) effect on consumption 
expenditures: the higher the consumers’ utility, the higher the willingness to pay a higher price for 
products under regulation (Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016; Swinnen, 2016). 
From producers’ perspective, NTMs imply higher costs of compliance, both fixed costs (e.g. 
upgrade of practice codes and facilities, acquisition of certificates, conformity in marketing 
requirements) and variable costs (e.g. prolonged delivery time due to inspection and testing 
procedures at custom points, rejection of certain shipments, denial of entry of certain shipments) 
(Xiong and Beghin, 2014; Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016), determining a reduction in profits and 
supply. The reduced supply increases the equilibrium price and producers’ revenue. The net effect 
on producers’ profits depends on the magnitude of (positive) gain in revenue, compared to the size 
of (negative) implementation costs: the lower the implementation costs, the higher the gain in 
revenue for products under regulation (Swinnen, 2016). 
For exporters, a NTM implemented in the destination country implies higher costs of compliance 
and a higher import price. If the difference between import price pre- and post-NTM is greater 
(smaller) than the difference between domestic price pre- and post-NTM, domestic producers face 
smaller (greater) implementation costs and obtain greater (lower) profits than foreign producers. 
The NTM acts as barrier (catalyst) for trade if it reduces (increases) domestic imports (Swinnen, 
2017). 
 
2.2 An empirical perspective 
The empirical literature on non-tariff measures (NTMs) and trade provides mixed evidence. Several 
studies suggest that NTMs hamper trade (e.g. Peterson et al., 2013; Dal Bianco et al., 2016), others 
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conclude that they foster trade (e.g. Cardamone, 2011), and numerous studies show mixed effects of 
NTMs on trade (e.g. Xiong and Beghin, 2011; Beckman and Arita, 2016). Such heterogeneity may 
be explained by the characteristics of empirical studies, which differ in terms of design and 
methods. 
Only few studies provide a general assessment of the trade effects of NTMs: a remarkable case is 
Hoeckman and Nicita (2011) who suggest that NTMs are major frictions to trade of agri-food 
products. Differently, most of empirical studies are partial and focused on NTM-, product-, or 
country-specific case studies. 
Different types of NTMs may lead to different empirical results. Different interventions may have 
different effects on trade (Schlueter et al., 2009). In addition, the lower the aggregation of NTMs 
under investigation, the crisper the policy implication for addressed issues (Li and Beghin, 2012). 
Accordingly, in literature we find that Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) tend to be catalysts for 
trade (e.g. de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006), whereas Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) 
show mixed evidence (e.g. Schlueter et al., 2009; Jayasinghe et al., 2010; Crivelli and Gröschl, 
2016). Divergences may be due to the peculiarity of the SPSs, which may have either: “a 
substantial positive impact [… or] a significant negative impact.” (Schlueter et al., 2009, p. 1489). 
The Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) tend to act as barrier to trade (e.g. Otsuki et al., 2001 a, b; 
Chen et al., 2008; Ferro et al., 2015). 
The effects of NTMs may be also sector- and/or product- specific. For instance, NTMs are likely to 
be trade-impeding for seafood products (e.g., Anders and Caswell 2009), meat (Wilson et al., 2003), 
fruits and vegetables, cereals and oil seeds (e.g., Otsuki et al., 2001a, b; Scheepers et al., 2007; 
Drogué and DeMaria 2012). Vice-versa, trade of fats and oils seems not affected by beyond-the-
border policies (e.g. Xiong and Beghin 2011). 
In addition, countries involved in empirical analyses may determine specific geo-economic patterns 
of NTMs . In this regard, studies that investigate the impacts of NTMs implemented by developed 
countries against developing countries are frequent in literature, and tend to show negative effects 
on trade performances of developing countries (e.g. Anders and Caswell, 2009; Disdier and 
Marette, 2010). Vice-versa, NTMs may have either negative (e.g. Yue and Beghin, 2009) or 
positive effects (de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006) on trade among developed countries. 
Differently, NTMs tend to limit trade among developing countries (Melo et al., 2014). 
Other sources of heterogeneity  may be related to the variety of methodological and empirical 
approaches we find in literature. An example are the different proxies used to measure NTMs: some 
methodologies include inventory measures (e.g. dummy or count variables, frequency index, 
coverage ratio, prevalence score), computation of price gaps, and the estimation of ad valorem 
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equivalents (AVEs) (Gourdon, 2014). In literature, the effects on trade tend to be negative if NTMs 
are proxied by AVE (e.g. Olper and Raimondi, 2008; Arita et al., 2017), or by frequency index 
and/or coverage ratio (e.g. Jongwanich, 2009; Fernandes et al., 2017). Differently, if NTMs are 
proxied by dummy or count variables, the results may be either positive (e.g. Cardamone, 2011; 
Shepherd and Wilson, 2013) or negative (e.g. Peterson et al., 2013; Dal Bianco et al., 2016). 
Lastly, different types of data do matter. For instance, both Schlueter et al. (2009) and Beckman and 
Arita (2016) estimate the effect of SPSs on trade of meat between developed countries: the formers 
use data aggregated at HS-4 digit and estimate a positive effect on trade; the latters use data 
aggregated at HS-6 digit and highlight a negative effect on trade. 
Due to the large heterogeneity in trade effects of NTMs, a systematic assessment of potential 
determinants of these effects is worth. 
 
3. The meta-analytical approach 
The heterogeneity characterises all economic researches (Havránek, 2010): the empirical literature 
on trade effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs) is not exempt. Since the pioneering work of Stanley 
and Jarrell (1989), economic meta-analyses (MAs) aim at assigning a pattern to such heterogeneity. 
The MA is an econometric approach that allows to combine and summarise evidence from different 
but comparable empirical studies, and to explain the wide variation of results across studies 
(Stanley et al., 2008). This analytic technique allows to test competing theories and to synthesize 
empirical estimates (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) suggest 
that theoretical competition may shape the distribution of reported empirical findings and worsen 
publication selectivity. The publication selection is a main concern of MA: it may bias estimates 
and create heterogeneity across studies, undermining the validity of inferences and policy 
implications (Stanley et al., 2008; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2013).) Publication selection biases 
may concern the propensity of academics towards a particular direction of results (i.e. negative or 
positive estimates) (type I bias), or may occur if statistically significant results are treated more 
favourably, thus are more likely to be published (type II bias) (Stanley, 2005; Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2014). 
The MA is becoming more and more popular in economics: for instance, it has been applied to the 
price elasticity of demand (Böcker and Finger, 2017), the calorie-income elasticity (Santeramo and 
Shabnam, 2015), and to food safety (Xavier et al., 2014). It has been also used to investigate 
international trade: Rose and Stanley (2005) and Havránek (2010) analyse the effect of currency 
unions on trade; Disdier and Head (2008) examine potential causes of variation in distance effect on 
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bilateral trade; Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements 
on intra-bloc trade; Li and Beghin (2012) explain variations in estimated trade effects of technical 
barriers to trade. We focus on trade effects of NTMs in the agri-food sector. 
3.1 Literature searching criteria and selection process 
During the last twenty-five years the trend of (theoretical, 32%, and empirical, 68%) papers on non-
tariff measures (NTMs) has been exponential (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Trends of studies on trade effects of NTMs and notified NTMs in the agri-food sector. 
 
Source: elaboration on UNCTAD (2017), TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures. 
Note: We refer to top field journals (listed in Appendix A.1). 
 
We systematically reviewed the literature following the guidelines provided in Stanley et al. (2013). 
We searched studies in bibliographic databases: Scopus, Web of Science, and JSTOR provided 
access to multidisciplinary information from prestigious, high impact research journals; RePEc, 
IATRC, AgEcon Search, and Google Scholar allowed us to cover grey literature2 (i.e. working 
papers and conference proceedings); repositories of specific peer-reviewed journals3 and papers 
                                                          
2 In line with other analyses on trade issues (e.g. Disdier and Head, 2008; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010; Li and Beghin, 2012), we 
include working papers and conference proceedings to identify publication selection. The journal prestige may be a source of 
publication bias (Santeramo and Shabnam, 2015). In order to avoid double counting, we include working papers and conference 
proceedings that do not correspond to revised versions published in peer-reviewed journals. 
3 We consider the following journals: European Review of Agricultural Economics, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Economics, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Applied Economics Policy Perspective, World Bank Economic Review, World Development, 
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cross-references traced back further works. The search was carried out in August 2017 and was 
limited to researches published in a period ranging from 1990 to 2017. 
We used keywords such as ‘trade’ and ‘agri-food trade’, combined with other terms: ‘non-tariff 
measure/non-tariff barrier’, ‘technical barrier to trade’, ‘sanitary and phytosanitary standard’, 
‘maximum residue level’, ‘specific trade concern’. We identified 155 studies. Subsequently, each 
paper has been reviewed in depth, so to limit the analysis to papers that assess the trade effects of 
NTMs: we excluded theoretical studies, and papers that do not provide comparable empirical 
results4. The final sample includes 62 papers (47 published in peer-reviewed journals, and 15 from 
grey literature), 1,362 observations (point estimates of trade effects of measures, ETEMs) and 1,213 
estimated t-statistics5 (table 1)6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Agribusiness, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Development Studies, China Agricultural Economic Review, German 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
4 The appendix A.2 provides a list of excluded studies. 
5 We have 149 missing values for t-statistics due to the lack, in some papers, of standards errors and t-values. 
6 Appendix A.3 provides descriptive statistics for each papers included in the sample. 
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Table 1. Papers included in the empirical analysis. 
Authors Publication year Publication outleta Type of NTMb Main effect of NTMs on trade 
Anders and Caswell 2009 AJAE Other Negative 
Arita, Beckman, and Mitchell 2017 FP TBT; SPS Negative 
Babool and Reed 2007 EAAE CP MRL Negative 
Beckman and Arita 2016 AJAE SPS; Other Mixed effects 
Cardamone 2011 ERAE Other Positive 
Chen, Yang, and Findlay 2008 RWE MRL Negative 
Chevassus-Lozza, Latouche, Majkovic, and Unguru 2008 FP TBT; SPS; MRL; Other Mixed effects 
Crivelli and Gröschl 2016 WE SPS Mixed effects 
Dal Bianco, Boatto, Caracciolo, and Santeramo 2016 ERAE TBT; SPS Negative 
de Frahan and Vancauteren 2006 ERAE TBT Positive 
Disdier and Fontagné 2008 EAAE CP Other Negative 
Disdier and Marette 2010 AJAE MRL Negative 
Disdier, Fekadu, Murillo, and Wong 2008a ICTSD WP TBT; SPS Negative 
Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni 2008b AJAE TBT; SPS Negative 
Drogué and DeMaria 2012 FP MRL; Other None 
Essaji 2008 JIE NTM Negative 
Fernandes, Ferro, and Wilson 2017 WBER MRL Negative 
Ferro, Otsuki, and Wilson 2015 FP MRL Negative 
Ferro, Wilson, and Otsuki 2013 World Bank WP MRL Negative 
Fontagné, Mayer, and Zignago 2005 CJE NTM Negative 
Gebrehiwet, Ngqangweni, and Kirsten 2007 Agrekon MRL Negative 
Harrigan 1993 JIE NTM Negative 
Hoekman and Nicita 2011 WD NTM Negative 
Jayasinghe, Beghin, and Moschini 2010 AJAE SPS Negative 
Jongwanich 2009 FP SPS Negative 
Kareem 2014a CP SPS Mixed effects 
Kareem 2014b EUI RSCAS WP SPS Mixed effects 
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Table 1. (Continued). 
Authors Publication year Publication outleta Type of NTMb Main effect of NTMs on trade 
Kareem 2014c WP SPS Mixed effects 
Kareem 2016a ITJ SPS Mixed effects 
Kareem 2016b JAD SPS Mixed effects 
Kareem 2016c JCM Other Mixed effects 
Kareem, Brümmer, and Martinez-Zarzoso 2015 Global Food WP MRL; Other Negative 
Melo, Engler, Nahuehual, Cofre, and Barrena 2014 WD TBT; SPS; MRL; Others Mixed effects 
Moenius 2004 WP Other Mixed effects 
Moenius 2006 IATRC CP Other Mixed effects 
Munasib and Roy 2013 IAAE CP MRL Mixed effects 
Nardella and Boccaletti 2003 AAEA CP NTM; TBT; SPS Negative 
Nardella and Boccaletti 2004 AAEA CP SPS Mixed effects 
Nardella and Boccaletti 2005 AAEA CP TBT Positive 
Nguyen and Wilson 2009 SAEA CP SPS Negative 
Olper and Raimondi 2008 JAE NTM; Other Negative 
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a ERAE MRL Negative 
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001b FP MRL Negative 
Péridy 2012 ERI NTM Negative 
Peterson, Grant, Roberts, and Karov 2013 AJAE SPS Negative 
Saitone 2012 Agribusiness Other None 
Scheepers, Jooste, and Alemu 2007 Agrekon MRL Negative 
Schlueter, Wieck, and Heckelei 2009 AJAE SPS Mixed effects 
Schuster and Maertens 2013 FP Other Negative 
Shepherd and Wilson 2013 FP Other Mixed effects 
Shepotylo 2016 MP TBT; SPS; STC None 
Sun, Huang, and Yang 2014 CAER MRL None 
Tran, Nguyen, and Wilson 2014 Agribusiness MRL Mixed effects 
Vollrath, Gehlhar, and Hallahan 2009 JAE Other Mixed effects 
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Table 1. (Continued). 
Authors Publication year Publication outleta Type of NTMb Main effect of NTMs on trade 
Wei, Huang, and Yang 2012 CER MRL Negative 
Wilson and Otsuki 2003 JIE MRL Negative 
Wilson and Otsuki 2004 FP MRL; Other Mixed effects 
Wilson, Otsuki, and Majumdar 2003 JITED MRL Negative 
Winchester et al. 2012 WE TBT; SPS; MRL Negative 
Xiong and Beghin 2011 ERAE MRL Mixed effects 
Xiong and Beghin 2014 EI MRL Mixed effects 
Yue and Beghin 2009 AJAE TBT; SPS Negative 
aAcronyms are as follows: American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE), Food Policy (FP), European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE), Conference Proceeding (CP), 
European Review of Agricultural Economics (ERAE), Review of World Economics (RWE), World Economics (WE), International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Journal 
of International Economics (JIE), World Bank Economic Review (WBER), Working Paper (WP), Canadian Journal of Economics (CJE), World Development (WD), European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI RSCAS), International Trade Journal (ITJ), Journal of African Development (JAD), Journal of Commodity Markets (JCM), International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC), International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE), American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA), Southern Agricultural 
Economics Association (SAEA), Journal of Agricultural Economics (JAE), Economic Research International (ERI), Marine Policy (MP), China Agricultural Economic Review (CAER), China 
Economic Review (CER), Journal of International Trade & Economic Development (JITED), Economic Inquiry (EI). 
bAcronyms are as follows: NTMs stands for ‘Non-Tariff Measures’ (as general category), TBT stands for ‘Technical Barrier to Trade’, SPS stands for ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard’, MRL 
stands for ‘Maximum Residue Level’, STC stands for ‘Specific Trade Concern’. ‘Other’ includes measures not involved in previous categories, such as quality and quantity restrictions, Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), private standards, voluntary standards. 
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3.2 Empirical model 
The heterogeneity in the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs) is likely to depend on 
publication selection and characteristics of empirical studies. The t-statistics of ETEMs7 (?̂?) are 
regressed on the precision of the estimates (i.e. the inverse of the estimated standard error, ଵ
ఙෝ
), on J 
regressors related to the characteristics of the study (χ௝), and on K regressors related to potential 
publication selection (Ζ௞): 
 
 ?̂? = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ
1
𝜎ො
+ ෍ 𝛽௝
χ௝
𝜎ො
௃
௝ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛾௞Ζ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
+ 𝜀 (1) 
 
In line with Stanley et al. (2008), we include both variables (χ௝) that are likely to influence the 
estimates, but that are uncorrelated with the likelihood of acceptance, as well as variables (Ζ௞) that 
may influence the likelihood of acceptance for publication, but should not be informative on the 
estimates. The constant term (𝛼଴) collects potential information on the publication selection that are 
not directly included in the model (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). The error term (𝜀௜) is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). 
We estimate model in equation (1) through a robust regression technique to mitigate potential 
problems related to outliers and influential data points (Belsley et al., 1980). Influential data points 
are likely to exist in our sample because we use multiple estimates from the same study (that are 
likely to be correlated). Coefficients of the robust regression allow us to infer on the magnitude of 
ETEMs. 
In order to determine which drivers may explain the direction (positive or negative) of statistically 
significant ETEMs, we use a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model: the dependent variable is 
categorical (𝑌ெே௅)8 and it allows us to classify the ETEMs as negative (t-statistic lower than −1.96), 
not significant (t-statistic between −1.96 and 1.96), or positive (t-statistic higher than 1.96): 
 
 𝑌ெே௅ = ቐ
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ෞ ≤ −1.96
0 𝑖𝑓 − 1.96 < 𝑡ෞ < 1.96
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ෞ ≥ 1.96
 (2) 
 
By substituting the equation (2) in (1), we derive a system of two equations: 
                                                          
7 We use estimated t-statistics instead of ETEMs to avoid problems of heteroschedasticity (Stanley, 2001). 
8 Differently from Li and Beghin (2012), we classify negative significant ETEMs as ‘-1’ (instead of ‘1’), not significant ETEMs as 
‘0’ (instead of ‘2’), and positive significant ETEMs as ‘1’ (instead of ‘3’). 
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⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ln ቆ
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = −1)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 0)
ቇ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ
1
𝜎ො
+ ෍ 𝛽௝
χ௝
𝜎ො
௃
௝ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛾௞Ζ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
+ 𝜀
ln ቆ
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 1)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 0)
ቇ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ
1
𝜎ො
+ ෍ 𝛽௝
χ௝
𝜎ො
௃
௝ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛾௞Ζ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
+ 𝜀
 (3) 
 
where ln ቀ௉௥(௒ಾಿಽୀିଵ)
௉௥(௒ಾಿಽୀ଴)
ቁ and ln ቀ௉௥(௒ಾಿಽୀଵ)
௉௥(௒ಾಿಽୀ଴)
ቁ are the logarithms of the probability of having, 
respectively, negative and significant (rather than not significant) or positive and significant (rather 
than not significant) ETEMs. 
A Probit model is adopted to explain the drivers for statistical significance, and a Tobit model is 
used to deepen on the magnitude of the estimated t-statistics (accuracy of ETEMs). The dependent 
variable of the Probit model is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the i-th ETEMs is statistically 
significant (t-statistics lower than −1.96, or higher than 1.96), and 0 otherwise: 
 
 𝑌௉௥௢௕௜௧ = ൜
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡పෝ ≤ −1.96 𝑜𝑟 𝑡పෝ ≥ 1.96
0 otherwise
 (4) 
 
The dependent variable of the Tobit model is a continuous variable equal to the t-statistics of 
ETEMs (?̂?), if it is larger than the threshold value (1.96 in absolute value), and 0 otherwise: 
 
 𝑌 ௢௕௜௧(ିଵ.ଽ଺) = ൜
𝑡పෝ 𝑖𝑓 𝑡పෝ ≤ −1.96
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡పෝ > −1.96
       and       𝑌 ௢௕௜௧(ଵ.ଽ଺) = ൜
𝑡పෝ 𝑖𝑓 𝑡పෝ ≥ 1.96
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡పෝ < 1.96
 (5) 
 
In the Tobit model, both right- and left-censored, positive coefficients imply greater t-statistics and, 
thus, less accurate ETEMs; vice-versa for negative coefficients. 
In line with Li and Beghin (2012), we use a robust estimator of the clustered error structure to 
estimate MNL, Probit, and Tobit models. We assume independence among clusters (i.e. papers), 
and dependence among observations within each cluster (i.e. ETEMs of the same paper). 
 
3.3 Description of covariates 
Our model includes covariates related to the characteristics of the study (χ௝) and to the publication 
selection (Ζ௞), to explain heterogeneity in estimated effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs).The set 
of covariates related to the characteristics of the study allows us to control for types of NTMs, 
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proxies for NTMs, and the level of detail of the study. In particular, specific dummy variables 
account for types of measure (i.e. Technical Barrier to Trade, TBT, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standard, SPS, Maximum Residue Level, MRL9). 
Further dummies are used to proxy the intensive and the extensive margins of the NTM: ad valorem 
equivalent, or AVE, proxies the intensive margins by capturing the degree of protectionism of the 
NTMs (i.e. how much NTMs affect trade); dummy variables and indices proxy the extensive 
margins (e.g. existence or not of NTMs). 
We also use dummy variables to identify the level of details of the study: a dummy controls for the 
geo-economic affinity of countries that implement NTMs (i.e. reporters) and of countries affected 
by NTMs (i.e. partners): we classify reporters and partners into Northern (Developed Economies) 
and Southern (Developing Economies and Economies in transition) countries, according to the 
classification of the United Nations (2017). Other dummies control for the level of product 
aggregation (according to the Harmonised System10), and for the specific product category under 
investigation. 
We control for potential publication selection: some covariates are related to methodological issues, 
others to the publication process. In particular, we control for the adoption of fixed effects to 
account for multilateral trade resistance terms in gravity models, and for the treatment of zero trade 
flows. The zero trade flows problem is a common issue in studies based on the gravity equation; our 
sample includes several papers (87%) based on the gravity model.  
As for the publication process, we account for the prestige of the publication outlet, and for grey 
literature with specific dummies: one dummy controls for papers published in Q1 journals 
(according to the rank provided by Scimago Journal & Country Rank at the date of publication for 
the subject area ‘Economics and Econometrics’) and one dummy accounts for working papers. 
Furthermore, we use a dummy variable to control for the presence of more than one article 
published by the same author. Table 2 lists the covariates. 
 
                                                          
9 Countries frequently fix MRLs, as an alternative to SPSs, in order to ensure safe imports. The requirements on MRLs are not set in 
the WTO consultations, but they may be assimilated to the SPS A200 that sets the tolerance limits for residues and imposes a 
restricted use of certain substances in food and feed (UNCTAD, 2012). Due to these considerations, we distinguish SPSs and MRLs 
in separate categories. 
10 Commonly known as Harmonised System (HS), the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System is the internationally 
standardised system of names and codes used to classify traded products. We consider four level of aggregation: HS-2 digit, which 
corresponds to a Chapter (e.g. 09 - Coffee, Tea, Mate and Spices), HS-4 digit, which corresponds to a Heading (e.g. 0901 - Coffee, 
whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; Coffee husks and skins; Coffee substitutes containing coffee), HS-6 digit, which corresponds 
to Sub Heading (e.g. 090121 - Coffee, roasted, not decaffeinated), and HS-8 digit which corresponds to Subheading determining duty 
(e.g. 09012100 - no distinction with respect to 090121). 
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Table 2. Description of covariates and basic statistics. 
Covariates Description Type of variable Detail Mean 
t-statistic t-statistics related to ETEMs, estimated in literature Continuous 
 
-0.10 
Standard error Standard error related to ETEMs, estimated in literature Continuous 
 
0.91 
TBT Standard is a Technical Barrier to Trade Dummy 1 if TBT (0 otherwise) 0.15 
SPS Standard is a Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard Dummy 1 if SPS (0 otherwise) 0.27 
MRL Standard is a Maximum Residue Level Dummy 1 if MRL (0 otherwise) 0.18 
AVE Ad valorem equivalent (AVE) used to proxy standard Dummy 1 if AVE (0 otherwise) 0.06 
Dummy variable Dummy variable used to proxy standard Dummy 1 if dummy variable (0 otherwise) 0.35 
Index Frequency index or coverage ratio used to proxy standard Dummy 1 if index (0 otherwise) 0.10 
N-N North-North Dummy 1 if reporter and partner are developed countries (0 otherwise) 0.28 
N-S North-South Dummy 
1 if reporter is a developed country and partner is a developing 
country (0 otherwise) 
0.32 
HS-2 digit Product aggregated at 2 digits of Harmonised System Dummy 1 if product is aggregated at HS-2 digit (0 otherwise) 0.26 
HS-4 digit Product aggregated at 4 digits of Harmonised System Dummy 1 if product is aggregated at HS-4 digit (0 otherwise) 0.36 
Meat Product category under investigation is meat Dummy 1 if product category is meat (0 otherwise) 0.10 
Dairy Product category under investigation is dairy produce Dummy 1 if product category is dairy produce (0 otherwise) 0.05 
Cereal Product category under investigation is cereals Dummy 1 if product category is cereal (0 otherwise) 0.09 
Oilseed Product category under investigation is oil seeds and oleaginous fruits Dummy 1 if product category is oilseeds (0 otherwise) 0.13 
F&O Product category under investigation is animal or vegetable fats and oils Dummy 1 if product category is fats and oils (0 otherwise) 0.05 
Beverage Product category under investigation is beverage Dummy 1 if product category is beverage (0 otherwise) 0.04 
Country-pair f.e. Country-pair fixed effects Dummy 1 if country-pair fixed effects are used (0 otherwise) 0.07 
Time f.e. Time fixed effects Dummy 1 if time fixed effects are used (0 otherwise) 0.16 
Product f.e. Product/industry/sector fixed effects Dummy 1 if product fixed effects are used (0 otherwise) 0.04 
Zero trade Treatment of zero trade flows Dummy 1 if zero trade flows are treated (0 otherwise) 0.48 
Q1 
Peer-reviewed journal in the 1st quartile of Scimago Journal & Country Rank 
(SJR) at date of publication and subject area ‘Economics and Econometrics’ 
Dummy 1 if published in Q1 (0 otherwise) 0.42 
WP Gray literature: working paper Dummy 1 if published as WP (0 otherwise) 0.14 
Authors Paper co-authored by academics experienced on the issue Dummy 1 if experienced author (0 otherwise) 0.61 
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3.3.1 Collinearity diagnostics 
Our empirical model involves several dichotomous variables: potential collinearity may arise and 
confound estimation results. In order to test for collinearity, we use the variance inflation index 
(VIF) and the condition number: they do not exceed the threshold values 10 and 15, respectively, to 
avoid problems of multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980). 
As preliminary analysis, the correlation matrix shows that the correlation between the coefficients 
for ‘Publication bias’ and ‘SPS’, ‘N-S’ and ‘SPS’, for ‘F&O’ and ‘Oilseed’, and for ‘Beverage’ and 
‘Meat’ is remarkably high (more than 0.80). Diagnostic outputs suggest possible strong collinearity 
between the same variables. We dropped the covariates with the relative higher VIF: ‘Publication 
bias’, ‘Oilseed’, ‘N-S’, and ‘Beverage’. Collinearity diagnostics without the problematic covariates 
show no additional problems. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Description of the sample 
Our sample reflects the heterogeneity that is also observed in the literature. Papers supporting the 
‘standards as barriers’ view are the majority (34 papers), while papers that conclude on the 
‘standards as catalysts’ view are in limited number (3 papers). Several papers (21) papers propose 
mixed evidence. 
Several studies contain multiple ETEMs: in order to keep important information, we include all 
available evidence (Jeppensen et al., 2002), rather than opting for the preferred estimate method, or 
for a synthesis of the estimates (Card and Krueger, 1995; Stanley, 2001; Rose and Stanley, 2005). 
Table 2 describes the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs): 56% ETEMs (759 point 
estimates) are negative; 44% (605 point estimates) are non-negative (positive or zero). A majority 
of estimates (61%) are statistically significant, with 508 point estimates (37%) being negative and 
325 point estimates (24%) being positive. The mean and median values of (total) ETEMs are, 
respectively, -0.30 and -0.05 (confidence interval ranges from -3.33 to 2.73). 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs). 
ETEMs Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. C.I.a Obs.b 
Total -38.540 54.140 -0.048 -0.305 3.039 [-3.334; 2.734] 100% 
Non-negative (positive or zero) 0.000 54.140 0.280 1.031 2.966 [-1.935; 3.997] 44% 
Negative -0.001 -38.540 -0.456 -1.37 2.653 [-4.023; 1.283] 56% 
Significant -38.540 18.105 -0.160 -0.598 3.151 [-3.749; 2.553] 61% 
Significant non-negative (positive or zero) 0.000 18.105 0.580 1.263 2.296 [-1.033; 3.559] 24% 
Significant negative -38.540 -0.004 -0.734 -1.789 3.047 [-4.836; 1.258] 37% 
Not significant -12.920 54.140 0.004 0.155 2.795 [-2.640; 2.950] 39% 
Notes: In the sample, only two observations are equal to zero. 
a Confidence interval (C.I.) ranges between mean minus standard deviation (minimum) and mean plus standard deviation 
(maximum). 
b Percentages computed on the total number of observations (1,364). 
 
Figure 2 presents the distribution (boxplots) and the kernel densities of total, positive, and negative 
ETEMs11: half of the statistically significant ETEMs (680 observations out of 1,364) ranges 
between median values of (statistically significant) negative (MeNeg. = -0.42) and of (statistically 
significant) positive (MePos. = 0.34) observations (figure 2, panel (i)). The distribution of total 
ETEMs is bimodal with one negative peak (MoNeg. = -0.21) and one positive peak (MoPos. = 0.02). 
Negative and positive ETEMs are almost equally dispersed (the standard deviations of negative, 
σNeg. = 2.65, and positive ETEMs, σPos. = 2.97 are close) (figure 2, panel (ii)). 
 
                                                          
11 The distribution and kernel density estimated in figure 2 refer to a subsample which ranges between the 10th and the 95th 
percentiles. 
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Figure 2. Estimated trade effect of measures (ETEMs) arranged by direction. 
 
Notes: In panel (i), distributions of ETEMs are on statistically significant observations within the 10th and the 95th percentiles. 
Horizontal lines within boxes are median values (Me) (i.e. MeNeg. = -0.42, MeTot. = -0.16, MePos. = 0.34). In panel (ii), the estimated 
densities for ETEMs are computed removing observations which exceed the 10th and the 95th percentiles. Dashed lines are median 
values (Me) computed on total observations (i.e. MeTot. = -0.05, MePos. = 0.28, MeNeg. = -0.46). 
 
Several variables seem correlated with the magnitude and the direction of NTMs’ trade effects (e.g. 
geo-economic areas, type of NTMs). Figure 3 shows that the ETEMs differ across geo-economic 
areas. Papers that investigate North-North or North-South trade (40 papers, 822 point estimates) are 
in larger number with respect to papers that analyse South-North or South-South trade (3 papers, 76 
point estimates) (figure 3, panel (i)). The variability of ETEMs across papers that consider North-
North (σN-N = 3.19) or North-South (σN-S = 4.17) trade is larger compared to that of papers for 
South-South trade (σS-S = 0.68). However, the median of ETEMs is lower for North-South (MeN-S = 
-0.10) trade than for North-North (MeN-N = -0.01) trade (figure 3, panel (ii)). 
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Figure 3. Estimated trade effect of measures (ETEMs) arranged by geo-economic areas. 
 
Notes: Geo-economic areas are as follows: N-N stands for ‘North-North’, N-S stands for ‘North-South’, S-N stands for ‘South-
North’, S-S stands for ‘South-South’, where the formers are countries imposing NTMs (reporters) and the latters are countries 
affected by NTMs (partners). Reporters and partners are classified into North (Developed Economies) and South (Developing 
Economies and Economies in transition), according to the country classification proposed by the United Nations (2017). In panel 
(ii), the estimated densities for ETEMs are computed removing observations which exceed the 10th and the 95th percentiles. Dashed 
lines are median values (Me) computed on total observations (i.e. MeTot. = -0.05, MeN-N = -0.01, MeN-S = -0.10, MeS-S = -0.09). 
Kernel density estimate for S-S is omitted because there are only two observations for ETEMs. 
 
The ETEMs differ also by types of measure (figure 4). A majority of papers focuses on measures 
aiming at protecting human health (17 papers on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPSs, and 
25 papers on Maximum Residue Levels, MRLs: 504 point estimates), while several studies (15 
papers, for 362 point estimates) report evidence for NTMs not involved in specific categories (such 
as Technical Barriers to Trade, TBTs, SPSs, MRLs, or Specific Trade Concerns, STCs): these cases 
(grouped under the tag ‘Other’) show a large heterogeneity in estimates, ranging from more than 
fifty to less than minus fifteen (figure 4, panel (i)). The variabilities of ETEMs for papers that 
analyse different types of NTMs are similar (σTBT = 3.51, σSPS = 3.66, σOther = 3.65), exception 
made for papers on MRLs, for which the variability is rather low (σMRL = 2.20). While the median 
values of ETEMs associated with TBTs and MRLs are close to zero (MeTBT = 0.01, MeMRL = 0.02), 
the median for SPSs is negative (MeSPS = -0.11) (figure 4, panel (ii)). 
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Figure 4. Estimated trade effect of measures (ETEMs) arranged by types of measure. 
 
Notes: Types of measure are as follows: TBT stands for ‘Technical Barrier to Trade’, SPS stands for ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standard’, MRL stands for ‘Maximum Residue Level’, STC stands for ‘Specific Trade Concern’, ‘Other’ includes measures not 
involved in other categories (e.g. quality and quantity control measures, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), 
private standards, voluntary standards). In panel (ii), the estimated densities for ETEMs are computed removing observations which 
exceed the 10th and the 95th percentiles. Dashed lines are median values (Me) computed on total observations (i.e. MeTot. = -0.05, 
MeTBT = 0.01, MeSPS = -0.11, MeMRL = 0.02, MeOther = -0.09). Kernel density estimate for STC is omitted because there are only 24 
observations for ETEMs. 
 
4.2 Regression results 
We compare the results of robust regression, Multinomial Logit (MNL), Probit, and Tobit models 
The type of non-tariff measures (NTMs) does matter in determining magnitude, direction, and 
accuracy of the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs). If a study deepens on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBTs) or Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs), ETEMs tend to be 
greater, more accurate if significant, and significant negative with a lower probability (table 4, 
columns A, B, E, and F). ETEMs are greater also if Maximum Residue Level (MRL) is the measure 
under investigation, and are more likely to be significant positive, but less accurate, (table 4, 
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columns A, C, and F). Our findings extend the evidence provided by Li and Beghin (2012): we 
disentangle the effects of TBTs and SPSs, and show the contribution of MRLs on trade. 
As for the proxies used for NTMs, ETEMs tend to be lower and significant, regardless of the proxy 
(table 4, columns A and D). In particular, dummy variable and frequency index/coverage ratio are 
more likely to provide significant positive ETEMs (table 4, column B). 
The level of detail of the study has a varying contribution on magnitude, significance, precision, and 
direction of ETEMs. Studies that deepen on NTMs across countries with similar levels of economic 
development (‘N-N’) tend to report ETEMs significantly different from zero and more accurate 
(table 4, columns D, E, and F). Our results expand the findings provided by Li and Beghin (2012, p. 
507), who observe that “when the NTM is a SPS policy regulating agri-food exports from a 
developing exporter to a developed importer, the probability to observe a trade impeding effect 
increases substantially”. 
If data are aggregated at HS-2 digit or HS-4 digit, ETEMs are greater (table 4, column A): in 
particular, the higher the disaggregation, the higher the probability of significant ETEMs, that tend 
to be less accurate if significant negative (table 4, columns D and E). 
As for specific product categories, ETEMs tend to be greater for cereal (table 4, column A), 
significant (either negative or positive) with higher probability for meat, but not for dairy (table 4, 
columns B, C, and D), more accurate if significant positive for fats and oils (table 4, columns F). In 
line with Li and Beghin (2012) we show that technical measures are not likely to be trade-
enhancing for processed food products (e.g. dairy produce, fats and oils), while we also found that 
this is not always true (e.g. meat). 
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Table 4. Regression results. 
Covariates 
 Robust regression  MNL  Probit  Tobit 
 ?̂?  ln ቆ
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = −1)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 0)
ቇ ln ቆ
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 1)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌ெே௅ = 0)
ቇ  𝑃𝑟൫𝑌௉௥௢௕௜௧ = 1 | Β௝,௜ , Γ௞,௜൯  𝑌 ௢௕௜௧(ିଵ.ଽ଺) 𝑌 ௢௕௜௧(ଵ.ଽ଺) 
 A  B C  D  E F 
𝛽ଵ: TBT 
 0.118 ***  -0.180 ** 0.020   -0.016   12.170 * 0.207  
 (0.030)   (0.070)  (0.031)   (0.018)   (7.032)  (0.250)  
𝛽ଶ: SPS 
 0355 *  -0.036 *** 3.04   -4.450   0.0002 ** 0.938 ** 
 (0.211)   (0.334)  (4.82)   (3.070)   (0.008)  (0.389)  
𝛽ଷ: MRL 
 0.004 ***  -0.024  0.002 **  0.001   2.031  0.020 ** 
 (0.002)   (0.021)  (0.001)   (0.0004)   (1.689)  (0.008)  
𝛽ସ: AVE 
 -0.161 **  0.130 *** 0.091 *  0.078 ***  -1.837  0.221  
 (0.067)   (0.045)  (0.048)   (0.024)   (2.511)  (0.335)  
𝛽ହ: Dummy variable 
 -0.130 ***  0.0619 *** 0.049   0.039 ***  -0.800  0.333  
 (0.018)   (0.018)  (0.036)   (0.012)   (1.633)  (0.270)  
𝛽଺: Index 
 -0.056 ***  0.033 * -0.002   0.016 *  -0.870  -0.069  
 (0.011)   (0.020)  (0.026)   (0.008)   (0.566)  (0.153)  
𝛽଻: N-N 
 0.004   -0.001  0.009   0.004 *  2.085 *** 0.116 *** 
 (0.015)   (0.010)  (0.010)   (0.002)   (0.218)  (0.033)  
𝛽଼: HS-2 digit 
 0.098 ***  -0.026  -0.042   -0.016   -0.280  -0.241  
 (0.030)   (0.042)  (0.031)   (0.014)   (2.604)  (0.303)  
𝛽ଽ: HS-4 digit 
 0.060 ***  0.007  0.007   0.002 *  -1.904 *** 0.013  
 (0.015)   (0.008)  (0.009)   (0.001)   (0.082)  (0.017)  
𝛽ଵ଴: Meat 
 0.119   0.397 * 0.469 *  0.275 **  -15.680  1.342  
 (0.139)   (0.223)  (0.265)   (0.117)   (11.730)  (1.687)  
𝛽ଵଵ: Dairy 
 -0.044   -0.183  -0.326   -0.147 **  7.278  -3.143  
 (0.088)   (0.112)  (0.238)   (0.063)   (8.311)  (1.937)  
𝛽ଵଶ: Cereal 
 -0.151 *  -0.024  -0.295   -0.059   -0.221  -1.825  
 (0.079)   (0.079)  (0.448)   (0.042)   (6.690)  (2.039)  
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𝛽ଵଷ: F&O 
 -0.048   0.059  0.063   0.031   -1.680  2.991 *** 
 (0.042)   (0.060)  (0.045)   (0.027)   (1.671)  (0.013)  
𝛾ଵ: Country-pair f.e. 
 -0.762 **  1.561 *** 1.618 **  0.948 ***  -39.160  8.520  
 (0.311)   (0.558)  (0.813)   (0.284)   (43.530)  (7.368)  
𝛾ଶ: Time f.e. 
 0.786   0.269  -0.113   0.091   -3.658  -4.339  
 (0.567)   (0.523)  (0.478)   (0.277)   (27.740)  (4.674)  
𝛾ଷ: Product f.e. 
 -1.285 ***  -0.008  -1.099 *  -0.196   -16.010  -9.968 * 
 (0.239)   (0.325)  (0.631)   (0.195)   (22.260)  (6.010)  
𝛾ସ: Zero trade 
 -1.501 ***  0.672 * -0.019   0.258   -38.140  -4.422  
 (0.278)   (0.404)  (0.432)   (0.182)   (27.060)  (4.836)  
𝛾ହ: Q1 
 -1.196 ***  0.070  -0.930 **  -0.209   -28.950  -11.640 ** 
 (0.357)   (0.443)  (0.408)   (0.179)   (25.440)  (5.842)  
𝛾଺: WP 
 -0.718 ***  -0.722  -1.469 **  -0.583   13.930  -8.198  
 (0.267)   (0.576)  (0.739)   (0.358)   (28.760)  (7.864)  
𝛾଻: Authors 
 -0.856 *  1.335 *** 1.338 *  0.812 ***  -50.060  7.062  
 (0.455)   (0.447)  (0.719)   (0.221)   (39.960)  (6.401)  
Constant 
 1.583 ***  -1.816 *** -1.370 *  -0.628 ***  176.400 * -14.790 ** 
 (0.298)   (0.497)  (0.758)   (0.240)   (95.610)  (7.417)  
Sigma 
            140.600 ** 19.020 *** 
            (70.580)  (3.346)  
Observations  1,210   1,213  1,213   1,213   1,213  1,213  
Notes: 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
The coefficient 𝛼ଵ has been omitted because of collinearity. 
The magnitude of estimated coefficients and related standard errors for variables ‘SPS’ are of the order of 10-15. 
Acronyms are as follows: North-North (N-N), North-South (N-S), Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard (SPS), Maximum Residue Level (MRL), ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE), Harmonised System (HS), peer-reviewed journal ranked in the first quartile following the classification of Scimago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) at the date of publication and 
the subject area ‘Economics and Econometrics’(Q1), working paper (WP). 
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Studies that include country-pair fixed effects provide lower and significant ETEMs (either negative 
or positive) with a higher probability (table 4, columns A, B, C, and D). Similarly, Li and Beghin 
(2012) pointed that the trade effects of technical measure are influenced by the use of multilateral 
trade resistance terms. ETEMs are lower also in studies with time fixed effects (table 4, column A), 
but significant positive with a lower probability and, in these cases, less accurate in studies with 
product fixed effects (table 4, columns C and F). On top of previous knowledge, we show that 
controlling for time and for product-specific (or sector/industry-specific) fixed effects impacts on 
magnitude, direction, and accuracy of ETEMs. 
If a study accounts for the treatment of zero trade flows, ETEMs tend to be lower and the likelihood 
of negative ETEMs significantly different from zero increases (table 4, columns A and B). 
Similarly, Li and Beghin (2012, p. 507) argue that “t-values are more spread out in the negative 
range when zero trade is treated”. 
Reflecting on the publication process, ETEMs are lower and less likely to be positive significant if 
provided in studies published in top journals (Q1) or in working paper series (table 4, columns A 
and C). In particular, if significant positive, ETEMs are less accurate if published in Q1 (table 4, 
column F). In addition, ETEMs are lower and significantly different from zero (either positive or 
negative) with higher probability if a study is co-authored by experienced scholars (table 4, columns 
A, B, C, and D). Similarly, Havránek (2010, p. 254) argues that the authorship helps explaining the 
direction and the magnitude of estimates. 
Our analysis deepens on several issues: a number of variables contribute to explain the 
heterogeneity in ETEMs. The magnitude of estimates is favoured by certain factors (type of NTMs, 
product aggregation), but limited by other determinants (proxy for NTMs, ‘cereal’, ‘country-pair 
f.e.’, ‘time f.e.’, ‘zero trade’, publication process). Some factors reduce the likelihood of having 
significant estimates (‘dairy’), others intensify this likelihood (proxy for NTMs, ‘authors’, ‘country-
pair f.e.’, ‘N-N’,  ‘HS-4 digit’, ‘meat’). Moreover, some variables boost (proxy for NTMs, 
‘authors’, ‘country-pair f.e.’, ‘zero trade’, ‘meat’) and others hamper (‘SPS’, ‘TBT’) the probability 
of estimating trade-impeding effects. Similarly, the likelihood of estimating trade-enhancing effects 
may be either intensified (‘authors’, ‘country-pair f.e.’, ‘MRL’, ‘AVE’, ‘meat’) or limited (‘Q1’, 
‘WP’, ‘product f.e.’) by specific variables. In addition, the accuracy of significant negative 
estimates increase with type of NTMs and decrease with ‘HS-4 digit’; vice-versa, the accuracy of 
significant positive estimates is favoured by certain variables (‘SPS’, ‘MRL’, ‘N-N’, ‘F&O’), but 
not by others (‘product f.e.’, ‘Q1’). Table 5 synthesises the evidence of our empirical models. 
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Table 5. Summary of findings on the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs). 
Covariates Magnitude Significance 
Negative 
significance 
Positive 
significance 
Accuracy of 
negative 
significant 
ETEMs 
Accuracy of 
positive 
significant 
ETEMs 
Type of NTMs 
TBT Greater n.s. Less likely n.s. More accurate n.s. 
SPS Greater n.s. Less likely n.s. More accurate More accurate 
MRL Greater n.s. n.s. More likely More accurate More accurate 
Proxy for 
NTMs 
AVE Lower More likely More likely More likely n.s. n.s. 
Dummy 
variable 
Lower More likely More likely 
n.s. 
n.s. n.s. 
Index Lower More likely More likely n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Level of detail 
of the study 
N-N n.s. More likely n.s. n.s. n.s. More accurate 
HS-2digit Greater n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
HS-4digit Greater More likely n.s. n.s. Less accurate n.s. 
Meat n.s. More likely More likely More likely n.s. n.s. 
Dairy n.s. Less likely n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Cereal Lower n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
F&O n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. More accurate 
Methodological 
issues 
Country-
pair f.e. 
Lower More likely More likely More likely n.s. n.s. 
Time f.e. Lower n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Product 
f.e. 
n.s. 
n.s. n.s. 
Less lilely n.s. Less accurate 
Zero 
trade 
Lower 
n.s. 
More likely 
n.s. 
n.s. n.s. 
Publication 
process 
Q1 Lower n.s. n.s. Less likely n.s. Less accurate 
WP Lower n.s. n.s. Less likely n.s. n.s. 
Authors Lower More likely More likely More likely n.s. n.s. 
Note: n.s. stands for ‘not significant’. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The rapid growth of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has stimulated an interesting academic debate. 
Discriminating between the economics and the politics of NTMs is a challenge for academics and 
policymakers: theory suggests that NTMs may both stimulate and hinder trade (Swinnen, 2017). 
Accordingly, in literature, two opposite views prevail: ‘standards as barrier’ versus ‘standards as 
catalyst’, with the empirical evidence being quite heterogeneous. 
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In order to characterise the heterogeneity in estimates, we qualitatively and quantitatively reviewed 
the empirical literature on the effects of NTMs on global agri-food trade. We explain the differences 
in findings, in terms of magnitude, direction, statistical significance, and accuracy of estimates, with 
several control factors: types of NTMs, proxies used for NTMs, level of details of studies, 
methodological issues, and publication process. We build on the existing evidence provided in Li 
and Beghin (2012) with further details and focusing on the agri-food sector. 
We found that the estimated trade effects of measures (ETEMs) are overestimated by types of 
NTMs, but underestimated by proxies of NTMs. Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) and ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE) tend to favour trade, whereas it is not always true that Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards (SPSs) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) limit trade. 
The level of detail also matters: for instance, analysing trade between developed countries or 
working with disaggregated data plays in favour of significant estimates. Magnitude, significance, 
and accuracy of ETEMs may be also product-specific. 
Last but not least, robust methodological approaches, and evidence provided by experienced 
authors, are correlated with higher chances of observing statistically significant, although 
underestimated ETEMs. Controls for specific methodological issues (e.g. inclusion of multilateral 
resistance terms, treatment of zero trade flows) is advisable. 
Our results highlight that magnitude, direction, statistical significance, and accuracy of ETEMs are 
case-specific. This is in line with Livingston et al. (2008) who suggest that, in evaluating NTMs, 
economists try to compare benefits for trade and costs of management, production, market, and 
resource potentially related to an outbreak of disease or pest, finding difference on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, the trade effects of NTMs are likely to depend on specific countries, products, and 
standards: generalisations are not feasible. A plausible explanation is that the variability in trade 
effects may reflect divergences among countries’ food safety regulations and standards, differences 
in consumers’ preferences across countries, ability (or limited capacity) to produce safe food, and 
willingness to pay for risk-reducing technology (Buzby and Mitchell, 2006; Jongwanich, 2009). 
The present analysis helps distinguishing ‘causes’ and ‘confounding factors’ that hinder the effects 
of policy measures on trade, and it aims to support applied economists and policymakers in 
understanding how NTMs shape trade flows. Academics should consider the importance to use 
suitable proxy for NTMs and to control for specific methodological issues, in order to provide 
estimates the more reliable as possible. Policymakers should carefully evaluate the peculiar effects 
and consequences of introducing new NTMs or modifying the existent ones on trade in certain 
sectors or between certain countries. 
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Appendix 
A.1 A comparison with Li and Beghin (2012) 
Li and Beghin (2012) propose a meta-analysis to explain how the variation in estimated trade 
effects of technical barriers to trade is affected by a number of explanatory variables (e.g. data 
sampling, methodology differences). They analyse a set of 27 papers dealing with technical 
measures (i.e. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPSs, Technical Barriers to Trade, TBTs, and 
Maximum Residue Levels, MRLs) and theoretically based on gravity model. 
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We analyse a newer, larger, and updated dataset, following the methodological arguments of meta-
analysis (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989; Stanley, 2005; Stanley et al., 2008; Stanley et al., 2013). In fact, 
the number of studies published since 2012 has grown tremendously: in five years at least 49 papers 
have been published in peer-reviewed journals (see figure A.1). This growing trend calls for 
specific attention: are findings of Li and Beghin (2012) still valid or does empirical literature show 
a trend reversal? 
 
Figure A.1. Trend of published researches on trade effects of NTMs over time. 
 
 
We analyse a wider sample in terms of number of papers considered (62 papers), type of measures 
investigated, and theoretical framework (not only gravity-based papers). As for the type of 
measures under investigation, in addition to SPSs, TBTs, MRLs, we include studies on standards 
that pursue similar scopes (e.g. protect consumers’ health and safety, reducing asymmetric 
information): some examples are quality and quantity control measures, private standards, voluntary 
standards, requirements on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). 
We use a twice as large set of explanatory variables. We expand the number of variables able to 
influence the likelihood of acceptance of the study (7 vs. 2), and find that they matter. We also 
expand the number of variables that may affect magnitude and direction of the estimates (13 vs. 9). 
In particular, we use dummy variables to explain the influence of type of NTMs, proxy used for 
NTMs, and level of details of the study. 
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Following the same approach of Li and Beghin (2012), we adopt a robust regression technique and 
perform a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model. In addition, we present findings from a combination of 
Probit and Tobit models: the former allows us to disentangle the probability that a certain driver 
determines statistically significant estimates; the latter allows us to quantify the accuracy of 
significant estimates. 
 
A.2 Additional notes to the selection of studies and exclusion criteria 
The search of relevant studies on ‘trade and non-tariff measures (NTMs)’ were performed through 
bibliographic databases (Scopus, Web of Science, JSTOR, RePEc, IATRC, AgEcon Search, Google 
Scholar) and repositories of field journals (table A.1). 
 
Table A.1. List of field journals, classified according to their rank in Scimago Journal & Country Rank (SJR). 
Journal SJRa 
Agribusiness Q2 
Agricultural Economics Q1 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics Q1 
Applied Economics Policy Perspective Q2 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Q2 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics Q2 
China Agricultural Economic Review Q3 
European Review of Agricultural Economics Q1 
German Journal of Agricultural Economics Q3 
Journal of Agricultural Economics Q1 
Journal of Development Economics Q1 
Journal of Development Studiesb Q1 
World Bank Economic Review Q1 
World Development Q1 
a The rank is referred to the subject area ‘Economics and Econometrics’ at 2017. 
b The rank is referred to the subject area ‘Development’ at 2017. 
Table A.2 provides the list of the first 10 papers identified in Google Scholar on the basis of each 
keyword (i.e. ‘agri-food trade’ and ‘non-tariff measure/non-tariff barrier’/‘technical barrier to 
trade’/‘sanitary and phytosanitary standard’/‘maximum residue level’/‘specific trade concern’). The 
same procedure has been used for each of bibliographic databases of references. The indicator, that 
ensures the inclusion of all relevant papers in the sample, is the frequency of appearance of a paper 
across the use of different keywords and sources of adoption. 
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Table A.2. Literature searching criteria adopted in each bibliographic database: example on Google Scholar. 
Keywords References 
Agri-food 
trade 
Non-tariff 
measures 
1. Disdier, A.C., & van Tongeren, F. (2010). Non-tariff measures in agri-food trade: What do the data tell us? Evidence from a cluster analysis on OECD 
imports. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 32(3), 436-455. 
2. Chevassus-Lozza, E., Latouche, K., Majkovič, D., & Unguru, M. (2008). The importance of EU-15 borders for CEECs agri-food exports: The role of tariffs 
and non-tariff measures in the pre-accession period. Food Policy, 33(6), 595-606. 
3. Bureau, J.C., Marette, S., & Schiavina, A. (1998). Non-tariff trade barriers and consumers' information: The case of the EU-US trade dispute over beef. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 25(4), 437-462. 
4. Hooker, N.H., & Caswell, J.A. (1999). A Framework for Evaluating Non‐Tariff Barriers to Trade Related to Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulation. Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 50(2), 234-246. 
5. Otsuki, T., Wilson, J.S., & Sewadeh, M. (2001). Saving two in a billion: quantifying the trade effect of European food safety standards on African exports. 
Food policy, 26(5), 495-514. 
6. Henson, S., & Loader, R. (2001). Barriers to agricultural exports from developing countries: the role of sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. World 
Development, 29(1), 85-102. 
7. Anderson, K., & Martin, W. (2005). Agricultural trade reform and the Doha Development Agenda. The World Economy, 28(9), 1301-1327. 
8. Disdier, A.C., Fontagné, L., & Mimouni, M. (2008). The impact of regulations on agricultural trade: evidence from the SPS and TBT agreements. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90(2), 336-350. 
9. Winchester, N., Rau, M.L., Goetz, C., Larue, B., Otsuki, T., Shutes, K., ... & Nunes de Faria, R. (2012). The impact of regulatory heterogeneity on agri‐food 
trade. The World Economy, 35(8), 973-993. 
10. Beghin, J., Disdier, A.C., Marette, S., & Van Tongeren, F. (2012). Welfare costs and benefits of non-tariff measures in trade: a conceptual framework and 
application. World Trade Review, 11(3), 356-375. 
Non-tariff 
barriers 
1. Bureau, J.C., Marette, S., & Schiavina, A. (1998). Non-tariff trade barriers and consumers' information: The case of the EU-US trade dispute over beef. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 25(4), 437-462. 
2. Hooker, N.H., & Caswell, J.A. (1999). A Framework for Evaluating Non‐Tariff Barriers to Trade Related to Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulation. Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 50(2), 234-246. 
3. Henson, S., & Loader, R. (2001). Barriers to agricultural exports from developing countries: the role of sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. World 
Development, 29(1), 85-102. 
4. Otsuki, T., Wilson, J.S., & Sewadeh, M. (2001). Saving two in a billion:: quantifying the trade effect of European food safety standards on African exports. 
Food policy, 26(5), 495-514. 
5. Chevassus-Lozza, E., Latouche, K., Majkovič, D., & Unguru, M. (2008). The importance of EU-15 borders for CEECs agri-food exports: The role of tariffs 
and non-tariff measures in the pre-accession period. Food Policy, 33(6), 595-606. 
6. Disdier, A.C., Fontagné, L., & Mimouni, M. (2008). The impact of regulations on agricultural trade: evidence from the SPS and TBT agreements. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90(2), 336-350. 
7. Anderson, K., & Martin, W. (2005). Agricultural trade reform and the Doha Development Agenda. The World Economy, 28(9), 1301-1327. 
8. Lupien, J. R. (2002). The precautionary principle and other non-tariff barriers to free and fair international food trade. Critical Reviews in Food Science and 
Nutrition, 42(4), 403-415. 
9. Winchester, N. (2009). Is there a dirty little secret? Non-tariff barriers and the gains from trade. Journal of Policy Modeling, 31(6), 819-834. 
10. Henson, S., & Caswell, J. (1999). Food safety regulation: an overview of contemporary issues. Food policy, 24(6), 589-603. 
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Table A.2. (Continued). 
Keywords References 
Agri-food 
trade 
Technical Barriers 
to Trade 
1. Otsuki, T., Wilson, J.S., & Sewadeh, M. (2001). Saving two in a billion:: quantifying the trade effect of European food safety standards on African 
exports. Food policy, 26(5), 495-514. 
2. Li, Y., & Beghin, J. C. (2012). A meta-analysis of estimates of the impact of technical barriers to trade. Journal of Policy Modeling, 34(3), 497-511. 
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Relevant studies were selected on the basis of information available in titles, abstracts, and full texts 
(figure A.2). 62 empirical researches (peer-reviewed papers, 70%, and gray literature, 30%) meet 
the inclusion criteria (figure A.2). We included empirical researches that assess the trade effects of 
NTMs, while we excluded theoretical papers, as well as papers that provide not comparable 
empirical results (table A.3). 
 
Figure A.2. Literature searching criteria. 
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Figure A.3. Trend of empirical researches on trade effects of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) over time. 
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Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for papers included in the sample. 
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Cardamone (2011) 4 4 2 - - 1.76 5.36 8.04 0.54 17.36 
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de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) 11 10 10 1 1 1.55 1.48 1.04 -0.33 3.43 
Disdier and Fontagné (2008) 65 6 - 59 46 -2.30 -2.50 2.03 -7.59 1.03 
Disdier and Marette (2010) 3 3 3 - - 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.15 
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Disdier et al. (2008b) 64 33 17 31 22 0.01 0.02 1.12 -3.19 3.15 
Drogué and DeMaria (2012) 8 3 - 5 3 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 -0.23 0.12 
Essaji (2008) 2 - - 2 2 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 
Fernandes et al. (2017) 5 - - 5 4 -0.17 -0.21 0.10 -0.38 -0.16 
Ferro et al. (2013) 15 2 1 13 5 -0.96 -1.03 2.11 -5.68 4.46 
Ferro et al. (2015) 10 6 1 4 3 0.14 1.11 2.88 -0.23 9.22 
Fontagné et al. (2005) 8 1 - 7 6 -0.57 -0.61 0.81 -2.13 0.85 
Gebrehiwet (2007) 2 2 2 - - 0.39 0.39 0.03 0.37 0.41 
Harrigan (1993) 10 - - 10 10 -1.52 -1.89 1.04 -3.79 -0.72 
Hoekman and Nicita (2011) 11 - - 11 10 -0.17 -0.13 0.06 -0.19 -0.03 
Jayasinghe et al. (2010) 9 9 8 - - 0.35 0.39 0.06 0.34 0.48 
Jongwanich (2009) 1 1 1 - - 0.05 0.05 - 0.05 0.05 
Kareem (2014a) 2 1 1 1 1 0.81 0.81 3.55 -1.71 3.32 
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Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for papers included in the sample. 
References Obs. Positive obs. Positive significant obs. Negative obs. Negative significant obs. Me μ σ Min Max 
Kareem (2014b) 4 1 1 3 2 -1.59 -3.16 6.42 -12.16 2.71 
Kareem (2014c) 4 1 1 3 2 -1.59 -3.16 6.42 -12.16 2.71 
Kareem (2016a) 8 5 1 3 2 0.00 -0.42 0.99 -2.85 0.07 
Kareem (2016b) 2 1 1 1 1 1.76 1.76 6.11 -2.57 6.08 
Kareem (2016c) 5 4 
 
1 - 0.00 10.27 24.55 -2.85 54.14 
Kareem et al. (2015) 12 4 3 8 7 -0.07 3.72 6.91 -1.51 18.11 
Melo et al. (2014) 5 1 1 4 2 -0.41 -0.14 0.52 -0.46 0.76 
Moenius (2004) 80 56 56 24 24 0.06 0.05 0.28 -1.29 0.64 
Moenius (2006) 33 18 18 15 15 0.09 0.16 0.42 -0.49 1.32 
Munasib and Roy (2013) 8 7 - 1 - 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.19 
Nardella and Boccaletti (2003) 37 14 5 23 12 -0.31 -0.55 1.65 -5.12 2.84 
Nardella and Boccaletti (2004) 62 16 11 46 44 -2.56 -2.52 6.44 -24.82 16.97 
Nardella and Boccaletti (2005) 90 48 29 42 25 0.08 -0.48 5.08 -38.54 9.30 
Nguyen and Wilson (2009) 21 3 - 18 17 -1.10 -1.83 2.08 -8.22 0.12 
Olper and Raimondi (2008) 11 5 1 6 5 -0.43 0.68 5.97 -8.66 12.00 
Otsuki et al. (2001a) 25 23 3 2 1 0.88 1.25 1.38 -0.91 5.20 
Otsuki et al. (2001b) 2 2 2 - - 0.74 0.74 0.44 0.43 1.05 
Péridy (2012) 11 - - 11 11 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 
Peterson et al. (2013) 18 2 - 16 14 -0.91 -1.18 1.27 -5.27 0.26 
Saitone (2012) 40 24 1 16 - 0.06 0.05 0.43 -1.18 1.77 
Scheepers et al. (2007) 1 1 1 - - 0.26 0.26 - 0.26 0.26 
Schlueter et al. (2009) 40 23 11 17 8 0.02 0.00 0.36 -0.87 0.88 
Schuster and Maertens (2013) 68 25 3 43 33 -0.08 -0.08 0.16 -0.64 0.27 
Shepherd and Wilson (2013) 25 6 4 19 16 -0.03 -0.58 0.94 -3.80 0.47 
Shepotylo (2016) 72 35 9 37 8 0.00 -0.04 0.23 -0.82 0.71 
Sun et al. (2014) 6 3 - 3 - -0.44 -0.54 0.63 -1.36 0.02 
Tran et al. (2014) 52 50 43 2 - 0.18 0.99 1.21 -0.01 3.54 
Vollrath et al. (2009) 12 3 - 9 5 -0.34 -0.60 0.99 -3.18 0.80 
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Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for papers included in the sample. 
References Obs. Positive obs. Positive significant obs. Negative obs. Negative significant obs. Me μ σ Min Max 
Wei et al. (2012) 20 16 9 4 - 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.21 
Wilson and Otsuki (2003) 3 3 2 - - 0.34 0.52 0.54 0.09 1.12 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004) 3 3 3 - - 1.45 1.42 0.07 1.34 1.48 
Wilson et al. (2003) 2 2 2 - - 0.59 0.59 0.01 0.58 0.59 
Winchester et al. (2012) 28 14 - 14 7 -0.08 -1.14 3.22 -9.87 2.82 
Xiong and Beghin (2011) 24 11 3 13 5 -0.01 0.34 0.98 -0.72 3.00 
Xiong and Beghin (2014) 6 3 3 3 3 0.23 0.24 0.61 -0.42 0.93 
Yue and Beghin (2009) 1 1 1 - - 0.99 0.99 - 0.99 0.99 
 
